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Abstract 
As many empirical studies have shown, non-compliance with EU legislation has already 
been a significant phenomenon within the EU15. With the accession of twelve new 
Member States since 2004, all of which had to align their legal and administrative 
systems to the acquis communautaire within a very short time frame, the compliance 
issue has become even more pressing. Against this background, it is the aim of this 
paper to take a closer look at how four new Member States from Central and Eastern 
Europe fare in implementing EU legislation and how possible compliance problems 
could be remedied in the future.  
The paper presents findings from a comparative project on the transposition, 
enforcement and application of EU legislation from the fields of working time and equal 
treatment in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia. The results show that 
while transposition performance is relatively good, all four countries are marked by 
significant problems in application and enforcement. On the basis of intense focus 
group sessions involving practitioners from the four countries, the paper presents a set 
of strategies to improve the current state of affairs and concludes with some remarks on 
the chances for these options to be actually put into practice in the new Member States. 
 Introduction1
The domestic implementation of policies enacted at the EU level is a particularly 
challenging task. The EU is marked by a highly decentralised implementation structure 
that leaves responsibility for policy execution to the Member States. Like in some 
federal polities, the lower level of governance is in charge of administrative 
enforcement. If we focus on the implementation of EU Directives, one of the major 
legal instruments of the EU, it also becomes apparent that even parts of the decision-
making process are delegated to the domestic level. The standards laid down in 
Directives have to be incorporated into national law by Member States within a certain 
period of time. Only after this process of transposition is completed, may the rules be 
applied by societal target groups and enforced by administrations and the legal system 
at the domestic level. Given the heterogeneity of interests among the actors involved in 
EU decision-making and the high consensus requirements, EU policies often contain 
fuzzy concepts and leave certain issues to the discretion of Member States in order to 
facilitate agreement. What applies to implementation in general is thus particularly true 
for the domestic execution of EU policies: crucial decisions that may be decisive on the 
success or failure of a given policy are regularly taken at the implementation stage. 
As many empirical studies have shown, non-compliance with EU legislation has already 
been a significant phenomenon among the old Western European Member States (see 
e.g. Siedentopf/Ziller 1988; Duina 1999; Jordan 1999; Knill/Lenschow 2000; Börzel 
2003; Falkner/Treib/Hartlapp/Leiber 2005). With the unprecedented accession of 
twelve new Member States since 2004, however, the compliance issue has become ever 
more pressing. Especially the ten new Member States from Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE) are transition states with a view to not only economics but also to their political 
and legal systems. Many of them had a long way to go to become fully-fledged 
democratic systems with stable institutions and societies whose entire membership 
respects the rule of law.  
It is the aim of this paper to take a closer look at how Central and Eastern European 
Countries (CEECs) fare in implementing EU legislation and how possible compliance 
problems could be remedied in the future.  
                                                 
1   This paper is part of a larger research project on the transposition and application of EU Directives 
in new member states funded by the Austrian Ministry of Science under the TRAFO programme 
for transdisciplinary research (for details see http://www.ihs.ac.at/index.php3?id=1144). Thanks to 
our partners on the project (Elisabeth Holzleithner, Emmanuelle Causse, Petra Furtlehner, Andreas 
Obermaier, Marianne Schulze, Clemens Wiedermann and Caroline Wörgötter) for their important 
input. 
1 To answer these questions, the paper presents findings from a comparative project on 
the transposition, enforcement and application of EU legislation in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia, carried out in 2005 and 2006.
 We specifically look at 
three Directives from the fields of working time and equal treatment in the workplace. 
Most of the EU provisions we study had to be implemented before accession. Some of 
them, however, were due to be fulfilled after the CEECs had joined the EU. In addition, 
we screened the relevant reform activities both before and after accession. Therefore, 
we are in a position to address not only implementation efforts in the pre-accession 
phase but also post-accession compliance, although more cases and a longer period of 
observation would certainly be needed to generate a definite assessment. Our qualitative 
case studies primarily rely on expert interviews with relevant Ministry officials and 
with representatives from trade unions, employer’s organisations and NGOs; on focus 
group discussions involving those directly concerned with the relevant laws, or their 
representatives; as well as on an analysis of available legal documents, statistics and the 
scarce literature available in the field. 
The paper is structured as follows: The next section will summarise our empirical 
findings on the implementation performance of the four selected countries, with a view 
to legal transposition as well as actual enforcement and application. Then we aim to set 
these findings into context by discussing in how far the observed patterns fit into the 
‘worlds of compliance’ typology we have developed elsewhere 
(Falkner/Treib/Hartlapp/Leiber 2005; Falkner/Hartlapp/Treib 2007). We will proceed 
by presenting a set of useful strategies to improve the current state of affairs in Central 
and Eastern European countries. The Conclusions, finally, will assess the chances for 
these options to be actually put into practice in the new Member States.  
 
I. Implementation performance: good transposition, but wide gulf 
between the law and action 
The empirical analysis covered the transposition, enforcement and application of three 
EU Directives:  
-  The amended version of the Working Time Directive (2003/77/EC), which aims 
to improve the health and safety of workers by laying down maximum working 
time limits and minimum rest periods as well as annual leave entitlements; 
2 -  The amended Equal Treatment Directive (2002/73/EC), which prohibits direct 
or indirect gender discrimination as regards access to employment, vocational 
training and promotion, and working conditions; 
- The Employment Equality Directive (2000/78/EC), which prohibits 
discrimination based on religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation as 
regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working 
conditions. 
 
a) Transposition performance 
In overall terms, the four CEE countries fared comparatively well in transposing the 
three Directives into domestic legislation. 
With regard to the Working Time Directive, all four countries managed to complete the 
transposition process in an essentially correct manner before they joined the EU. The 
only important issue that they have not yet fulfilled is the ECJ’s case law in Simap and 
Jaeger with regard to on-call duties, but this is true for almost all other member states 
as well. It has been linked politically to the ongoing EU-level debates about a revision 
of the Directive, the understanding being that the member states would wait until the 
adoption of the revised Directive before they would take action in this respect. As some 
drafts discussed so far provided for an amended definition of working time to the effect 
that inactive periods spent on call would no longer have to be treated as working time, 
the revision of the Directive would mean that member states would no longer have to 
take action with regard to on-call working. After the governments repeatedly failed to 
agree on the updated version of the Directive, however, the Commission has announced 
that it will initiate infringement proceedings against all member states that do not 
comply with the ECJ’s case law (23 out of the then 25 member states – only Italy and 
Luxembourg are exempt) (Council of the European Union 2006; EIRO 2006).  
The transposition outcomes of the two equality Directives are somewhat more mixed. 
While Hungary completed transposition well before the deadline, Slovenia and Slovakia 
managed to adopt their respective anti-discrimination acts only a few days (Slovenia) or 
weeks (Slovakia) after their actual accession to the European Union. Given that the 
delays were very short (less than six months), we treat these cases as having been 
completed largely on time. The Czech Republic, however, has so far failed to transpose 
the two Directives in an essentially correct manner. Although reforms were enacted to 
incorporate the provisions of both Directives in a multitude of existing legislation 
3 governing various aspects of the employment relationship, this diffusive approach to 
transposition failed to fulfil all essential parts of both Directives. In spring 2006, efforts 
to enact a general anti-discrimination act, which would have closed the remaining gaps, 
foundered on the lack of support for this broad reform among the members of the 
government coalition. 
Despite the two cases of transposition failure in the Czech Republic, the overall record 
of our four countries in terms of legal compliance is good. 10 out of 12 cases (more than 
80 per cent) were completed largely on time and in an essentially correct manner. This 
may come as a surprise, especially in comparison with the fifteen ‘old’ member states’ 
performance in transposing six similar labour-law Directives, where “not even one third 
of all cases was transposed ‘almost on time’ and ‘essentially correctly’” 
(Falkner/Treib/Hartlapp/Leiber 2005: 267). 
The good transposition record is all the more remarkable since most reform processes 
were politically highly contested. With regard to working time, the bone of contention 
between political parties, trade unions and employers’ associations was the extent of 
flexibility. The political leaning of the respective governments clearly left its stamp on 
the substantive outcomes. The right-wing Slovak government under Prime Minister 
Dzurinda, for example, made full use of the flexibility offered by the Directive, thus 
incorporating a minimalist version of the Directive into domestic law. In the Czech 
Republic, by contrast, the centre-left Zeman government rejected the employers’ calls 
for more flexibility. In the end, therefore, transposition of the Working Time Directive 
in the Czech Republic turned out to be relatively supportive of employee protection.  
Similar patterns of political contestation could be observed in the transposition of the 
two equality Directives. The partisan orientation of governments again played a crucial 
role in these processes. The transposition of the two Directives in Hungary and Slovenia 
could be completed relatively swiftly, primarily due to the determination of the two 
centre-left governments to push these reforms, backed by trade unions and civil society 
organisations. The resulting anti-discrimination acts even went far beyond the European 
minimum requirements. They both covered many more grounds of discrimination than 
laid down in European legislation, and they extended the scope of the non-
discrimination principle beyond the area of employment. In the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia, by contrast, Christian-democratic government parties dragged their heels on 
the creation of encompassing anti-discrimination legislation. 
Given the relatively high level of political controversy that characterised most of the 
transposition processes we looked at, how can we explain the good overall transposition 
4 performance of our four countries? In our view, the answer is accession conditionality 
(Schimmelfennig/Engert/Heiko 2005; Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2004). Although 
some of the provisions in our sample had to be complied with after accession only, most 
of them were subject to the Commission’s pre-accession pressure. The prospect of being 
criticised for not fulfilling the acquis communautaire, and thus probably endangering 
smooth accession to the EU, served as a strong incentive for the political actors in our 
four countries to solve their disputes over how to transpose the Directives within the 
given time limits and in essential conformity with the legal requirements. 
At the same time, this does not imply that implementation efforts significantly 
decreased once accession had been accomplished. There is thus no pattern of ‘revenge’ 
for the high pressure exerted by the Commission in the pre-accession phase (for hints in 
this direction, see e.g. Ágh 2003; Goetz 2005). In Slovakia, the Anti-Discrimination law 
was adopted three weeks after EU accession. After becoming a member of the EU, 
moreover, the Hungarian parliament passed a piece of legislation intended to tighten the 
prohibition of sexual harassment. In the Czech Republic, at least some minor 
adaptations were accomplished after joining the EU. All this indicates that there was 
certainly no systematic end to transposition activity immediately after the end of pre-
accession supervision, although the fact that the Czech anti-discrimination bill was not 
adopted in spring 2006 and that the country thus continues to breach the legal 
requirements of the two equality Directives might give the impression that the 
importance of complying with EU rules has lost steam now that the country does no 
longer have to fear not being admitted to the ‘club’.  
In any case, it should be mentioned here that official data by the European Commission 
show that the transposition rates of our four new member states have steadily increased 
– rather than decreased – since accession. The Czech Republic, for example, improved 
its transposition rate from 89.88 per cent in August 2004 to 99.63 per cent in August 
2006. For Slovakia, the figures are 92.21 and 99.67, respectively. The other two 
countries show similar developments, although starting from a somewhat higher level.
2 
For sure, official transposition rates do not allow any insights on the completeness or 
correctness of the measures communicated to the Commission. Therefore, systematic 
empirical studies at a later point in time than ours are still needed to judge the post-
accession transposition performance of the new member states in an authoritative 
manner. 
                                                 
2   See the tables on “Progress in notification of national measures implementing directives” since 
mid-2004, available at http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/eulaw/index_en.htm (accessed at 
13.4.2007).  
5 b) Application and enforcement performance 
The picture changes significantly if we look at the enforcement and application stage. 
As a result of the societal and institutional difficulties associated with the transition 
from Socialist rule, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia are all plagued 
by a multitude of problems that have so far largely prevented the legislation to be 
realised in practice. 
In the field of working time, many employees voluntarily work longer hours than 
allowed by the law because they need the extra pay. This is a phenomenon that has 
already been observed in other (former) low-wage countries such as, e.g., Ireland 
(Falkner/Treib/Hartlapp/Leiber 2005: 114-115). Among the sectors where working 
excessive overtime is particularly widespread is health-care, where shift systems and 
on-call duties result in working hours that by far exceed the limits laid down in the 
European Directive. Major problems with overtime working were also reported from 
building, transport, agriculture, tourism and seasonal work, commerce, the food 
industry and catering.  
With regard to equality in the workplace, discriminatory practices, especially to the 
detriment of women and homosexuals, are still a widespread phenomenon in the four 
countries. There is a tendency among employers not to hire younger women because of 
possible pregnancies. Additionally, women are often discriminated with regard to 
promotion, which is highlighted by the low share of women in leadership positions. In 
general, female employment is concentrated in low-paid sectors where part-time, fixed-
term and other forms of precarious employment are widespread. Moreover, many 
women are confronted with sexual harassment by their male colleagues or superiors. 
Homosexuals often do not disclose their sexual orientation vis-à-vis their employers or 
colleagues for fear of being discriminated. The way in which high-ranking Christian 
democratic politicians in Slovakia openly agitated against the employment of 
homosexuals in schools, although certainly representing an extreme example, shows 
that these fears are not entirely ill-founded. Religious minorities seem to encounter less 
discrimination in our four countries, although we also found examples of discriminatory 
practices against religious groups. For example, Muslim women with headscarves were 
reported to be considered unsuitable for certain positions in Slovenia while wearing 
symbols of other religions was not stigmatised, and some religious groups in Hungary 
and Slovenia appeared to have difficulties getting time off for their religious rituals. 
The bulk of these application problems may be explained by societal and institutional 
shortcomings in the countries’ enforcement systems. It is important to highlight, 
6 therefore, that the wide gulf between transposition and practical implementation is not 
due to deliberate efforts at cheating by CEE governments. Rather than amounting to 
purposeful “tick the boxes implementation” (Richardson 1996: 282), these 
shortcomings thus reflect genuine capacity problems in the CEECs. To shed more light 
on these capacity problems, it is useful to distinguish two parallel enforcement tracks 
that are important for the areas covered by our three Directives. The two equal 
treatment Directives are mainly based on individual enforcement, which requires 
effective and easily accessible courts and well-informed and courageous employees 
willing to pursue their rights. Enforcement of working time rules also encompasses this 
bottom-up mechanism. In addition, however, it involves monitoring compliance by 
public authorities. In order for this to be effective, labour inspectorates must be 
equipped with sufficient resources, must be organised effectively and must have 
effective sanctions at their disposal to punish non-compliers. We will first discuss 
problems related to individual litigation (1–4) and then turn to the limits of monitoring 
activities by labour inspectorates (5). 
(1) A lack of individual litigation from below: The first major obstacle for employment 
legislation to become reality in the workplaces of the four countries is the lack of active 
litigation by employees. This has a number of reasons. As the introduction of the new 
laws was not accompanied by effective information campaigns either by the 
governments, by lower-level public authorities or by civil-society actors, employees 
often do not know their rights. This is particularly true for the field of equal treatment. 
In the area of working time, employees are traditionally better informed, mostly through 
their trade union organisations. Moreover, many employees do not dare to file 
complaints against their employer because they are afraid of losing their jobs. Although 
the equality Directives explicitly rules out such retaliatory action by employers, our 
information on everyday practice in the four CEE countries suggests that this provision 
has not been effective in overcoming litigation reluctance. The problem seems to be 
particularly severe in post-socialist countries such as our four CEECS, where many 
employees were used to life-long job security. It is aggravated in regions and branches 
with high unemployment rates and, therefore, low chances of finding a new job. As a 
result of the socialist heritage, finally, individual court actions have been introduced as 
an alien element of enforcement after 1989. Therefore, there is no litigation culture 
among the citizens of the four countries. In other words, the four CEECs cannot build 
on long-standing traditions of invoking one’s rights in court, as is the case in many ‘old’ 
member states.   
7 (2) A lack of support by civil society actors: Trade unions and other civil society actors 
are too weak to effectively support employees in pursuing their rights. Trade unions, 
which are confronted with widespread distrust among the populations of our four 
countries, as they are associated with the former socialist regimes, struggle with steadily 
declining membership rates. In 2004, these had dropped to 17 per cent of all employees 
in Hungary, 22 per cent in the Czech Republic (2003 figure) and 31 per cent in 
Slovakia. Slovenia, in contrast, stands out with a relatively high unionisation rate of 44 
per cent (CEC 2006: 25). Even there, however, less than half of all employees are 
organised in a trade union. Compared to countries like Denmark or Sweden, with 
unionisation rates of around 80 per cent (CEC 2006: 25), this still seems rather modest. 
Other civil society organisations, such as organisations of gays and lesbians, have only 
developed rather recently and struggle with a shortage of resources. Employees who 
may want to invoke their rights have thus too little support from societal organisations. 
Moreover, procedures for involving societal organisations in judicial proceedings have 
remained at a rather minimalist level in most countries. In general, interest associations 
may only support individual employees in legal proceedings relating to discrimination, 
as called for by the equality Directives. It is only in Hungary that societal groups may 
initiate, under certain conditions, discrimination-related proceedings themselves, 
without an individual being involved. In other areas and in the other three countries, 
however, the possibility of actio-popularis claims as a replacement for individual 
litigation does not exist. 
(3) Equal Treatment Bodies are promising babies with some teething problems: 
Another way of supporting individuals in pursuing their rights is the creation of 
independent public bodies that offer advice and assistance to individuals who feel that 
their rights have been violated. It has to be highlighted that those countries that have so 
far created Equal Treatment Bodies surpassed the European minimum requirements and 
extended their sphere of competence beyond the area of race and gender. The Equal 
Treatment Bodies of Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia are also responsible for assisting 
discrimination claims related to sexual orientation or religion. Moreover, these bodies 
do not only assist individuals in legal proceedings but they also act as easily accessible 
contact points that offer mediation and out-of-court settlements in discrimination-
related disputes. In this sense, they are certainly a valuable instrument for giving effect 
to the principle of equality in practice. However, all of these bodies are plagued by a 
lack of visibility, institutional standing and resources so that their actual performance 
has so far lagged behind their formal competences. Due to the political problems 
8 surrounding the transposition of the equality Directives, finally, the Czech Republic has 
not yet managed to create a proper Equal Treatment Body. 
(4) Shortcomings in the organisation of the judiciary: Lacking resources in the court 
systems make for lengthy court proceedings in some of our countries. According to our 
information, the usual period until a first-instance ruling is achieved in the field of 
labour law ranges from about one year in Slovenia, fourteen months in Slovakia, 
between one and two years in Hungary, and up to three years in the Czech Republic. 
Unfortunately, we lack comparable data for the EU15. In any case, durations of two or 
three years definitely show a negative effect on people’s willingness to go to court in 
the first place. The fact that it can take several years until a ruling is handed down thus 
acts as a serious impediment to individual litigation. Moreover, there seems to be a lack 
of attention for rulings by other courts, resulting in a situation where similar cases are 
often decided differently by different courts. This problem was reported to be 
particularly prevalent in the Czech Republic. 
(5) A lack of skilled inspectors and determination strains the work of labour 
inspectorates: The problem in our four countries seems to be less the absolute number 
of inspectors in charge of monitoring compliance with labour law provisions or a lack 
of competences to act directly against cases of non-compliance. Although more 
personnel could certainly improve the situation, the rate of inspectors per 100,000 
employees is not significantly below Western European standards. Moreover, they all 
have powers to act ex officio and are empowered to impose certain sanctions directly, 
without prior court proceedings. Instead, there are three other reasons to explain why 
many observers criticise the labour inspectorates for being ineffective in ensuring 
compliance with working time and equal treatment law.  
First, the labour inspectorates in the four countries focus heavily on issues of 
occupational safety and health, such as preventing work-related accidents, and on 
combating undeclared work. As most resources are deployed on these topics, not much 
is left for monitoring working time or equality issues. Second and related to this, 
inspectors often have a technical background and therefore lack expertise in the fields 
of our Directives. This is especially true for the relatively new equality laws. Third, 
there were reports from employee representatives, especially in Slovakia and Slovenia, 
accusing the labour inspectorates of having too close relations to employers and 
deliberately sparing companies that are in an economically tense situation. It thus seems 
that many employees do not see the labour inspectorates as a neutral partner to turn to if 
there is a problem in the workplace. Despite these problems, it has to be noted that there 
have been recent efforts to improve the organisational structures and the capacities of 
9 the labour inspectorates in Hungary and the Czech Republic. In these countries, there 
thus seems to be political willingness to improve the performance of the respective 
inspection services. In Slovakia, by contrast, recent reforms by the centre-right 
government rather yielded toward the opposite direction, involving a reduction of, 
rather than an increase in, the number of inspectors. 
In sum, there are many problems in the enforcement systems of the four countries we 
studied. As a consequence, many of the legal provisions that entered the statute books in 
order to fulfil the EU’s social policy acquis have so far largely remained ‘dead letters’. 
This underlines the importance of studying not only transposition but also have a close 
look at the actual execution of the enacted transposition laws. Had we followed the 
example of many current studies on compliance with EU legislation and only looked at 
transposition, our conclusions would have been much more positive. In contrast, 
scrutinizing how transposition laws are being put into practice in the four CEECs has 
revealed a much more gloomy picture. Just like Puchala’s (1972) blind men who try to 
discover the nature of an elephant by touching its ears or its trunk, our findings thus 
suggest that scholars who focus exclusively on the legal side of implementing EU 
legislation will fail to grasp the true nature of the whole implementation process. 
 
II. Setting the empirical findings into context: a typology of four 
worlds of compliance 
How do these findings fit in with the theoretical insights gained from the study of the 
EU15? One important argument, developed in an earlier study analysing the national 
transposition, enforcement, and application of six EU labour law Directives in the 
fifteen ‘old’ member states, was that there are different country clusters with different 
typical procedural patterns and, therefore, different styles of implementing EU 
legislation (Falkner/Treib/Hartlapp/Leiber 2005). These different “worlds of 
compliance” can be used as a filter that decides which explanatory factors are relevant 
for different countries and what the direction of their influence is. In this sense, crucial 
theoretical propositions in EU implementation research, including the misfit and the 
veto player approaches, are only ‘sometimes-true theories’ (Falkner/Hartlapp/Treib 
2007). 
Within the EU15, we identified three different worlds of compliance: 
In the world of law observance, the compliance goal typically overrides domestic 
concerns. Even if there are conflicting national policy styles, interests or ideologies, 
10 transposition of EU Directives is usually both in time and correct. This is supported by a 
‘compliance culture’ in the sense of an issue-specific ‘shared interpretive scheme’ 
(Douglas 2001: 3149), a ‘set of cognitive rules and recipes’ (Berger and Luckmann 
1967, quoted in Swidler 2001: 3064). Application and enforcement of the national 
implementation laws is also characteristically successful, as the transposition laws tend 
to be well considered and well adapted to the specific circumstances and enforcement 
agencies as well as court systems are generally well-organised and equipped with 
sufficient resources to fulfil their tasks. Non-compliance, by contrast, typically occurs 
only rarely and not without fundamental domestic traditions or basic regulatory 
philosophies being at stake. In addition, instances of non-compliance tend to be 
remedied rather quickly. The three Nordic member states (Denmark, Finland and 
Sweden) belong to this country cluster. 
Obeying EU rules is at best one goal among many in the world of domestic politics. 
Domestic concerns frequently prevail if there is a conflict of interests, and each single 
act of transposing an EU Directive tends to happen on the basis of a fresh cost–benefit 
analysis. Transposition is likely to be timely and correct where no domestic concerns 
dominate over the fragile aspiration to comply. In cases of a manifest clash between EU 
requirements and domestic interest politics, non-compliance is the likely outcome. 
While in the countries belonging to the world of law observance breaking EU law 
would not be a socially acceptable state of affairs, it is much less of a problem in one of 
the countries in this second category. At times, their politicians or major interest groups 
even openly call for disobedience with European duties – an appeal that is not met with 
much serious condemnation in these countries. Since administrations and judiciaries 
generally work effectively, application and enforcement of transposition laws are not a 
major problem in this world – the main obstacle to compliance is political resistance at 
the transposition stage. Austria, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK 
belong to this type. 
In the countries forming the world of transposition neglect,
3 compliance with EU law is 
not a goal in itself. Those domestic actors who call for more obedience thus have even 
less of a sound cultural basis for doing so than in the world of domestic politics. At least 
as long as there is no powerful action by supranational actors, transposition obligations 
are often not recognised at all in these ‘neglecting’ countries. A posture of ‘national 
arrogance’ (in the sense that indigenous standards are typically expected to be superior) 
                                                 
3   Building on the results of our new study on compliance in Central and Eastern Europe, we now 
suggest to slightly reformulate the label of this world (previously: ‘world of neglect’). 
11 may support this, as may administrative inefficiency. In these cases, the typical reaction 
to an EU-related implementation duty is inactivity. After an intervention by the 
European Commission, the transposition process may finally be initiated and may even 
proceed rather swiftly. The result, however, is often correct only at the surface. Where 
literal translation of EU Directives takes place at the expense of careful adaptation to 
domestic conditions, for example, shortcomings in enforcement and application are a 
frequent phenomenon. Potential deficiencies of this type, however, do not belong to the 
defining characteristics of the world of transposition neglect. Instead, negligence at the 
transposition stage is the crucial factor in this cluster of countries, which includes 
France, Greece, Luxembourg and Portugal. 
How do the new Member States fit into this scheme? As we have shown above, the 
implementation processes in the four CEE countries are marked by a combination of 
political contestation at the transposition stage and quite systematic problems at the 
enforcement and application stage. This is quite similar to two of the countries in the 
‘old’ EU15, Ireland and Italy. Both feature procedures characterised by domestic 
politics considerations when it comes to transposition and have clearly inappropriate 
enforcement systems.
4 To capture this combination of politicised transposition and 
systematic shortcomings in enforcement and application, we suggest a fourth category: 
the ‘world of dead letters’. Countries belonging to this cluster of our typology may or 
may not transpose EU Directives in a compliant manner, depending on the prevalent 
political constellation among domestic actors and the degree of supranational pressure, 
but then there is non-compliance at the later stage of monitoring and enforcement. In 
this group of countries, what is written on the statute books simply does not become 
effective in practice. Shortcomings in the court systems, the labour inspections and 
finally also in civil society systems are among the detrimental factors accounting for 
this. 
The typical process patterns of our extended typology of four worlds of compliance, and 
the countries belonging to each cluster, are summarised in Table 1 (see also 
Falkner/Treib 2007). 
                                                 
4   Therefore, we originally classified these two countries as belonging to what we then called the 
world of neglect if the focus is placed on the implementation process as a whole, and not only on 
transposition (Falkner/Treib/Hartlapp/Leiber 2005, chapter 15). With our new cases at hand, 
however, and with a view to ensuring a systematic and comprehensible typology, it seems 
preferable to conceptualise an additional world of compliance to grasp the new combination of 
typical patterns in the different phases. Consequently, we now subsume Ireland and Italy, along 
with the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia, under a separate world of compliance. 
12 Table 1: Four Worlds of Compliance 
  World of Law 
Observance 
World of Domestic 
Politics 
World of Dead 
Letters 
World of Trans-
position Neglect 
Process pattern at 
stage of trans-
position 
+  o o – 
Process pattern at 
stage of practical 
implementation 
+ + –  +/– 
Countries Denmark,  Finland, 
Sweden (3) 
Austria, Belgium 
Germany, Nether-
lands, Spain, UK 
(6) 
Ireland, Italy, 
Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Slovakia, 
Slovenia (6) 
France, Greece, 
Luxembourg, 
Portugal (4) 
+  = respect of rule of law; o  = political pick-and-choose; –  = neglect 
 
This typology highlights which of the various theoretical factors are relevant in which 
country setting. The point is that implementation processes tend to depend on different 
factors within each of the various worlds. The compliance culture in the field can 
explain many cases in the world of law observance. In the world of domestic politics 
and the world of dead letters, transposition is decisively influenced by the extent to 
which the EU’s rules match the political preferences of political parties and major 
interest groups. In the former, however, application and enforcement are generally 
effective, while the latter is marked by systematic shortcomings in the process of 
practical implementation. In the world of transposition neglect, finally, the decisive 
factor is administrative inertia at the transposition stage, caused by countervailing 
bureaucratic interests or malfunctioning routines. Given the huge problems in 
transposition, practical implementation is of secondary importance. 
 
III. Improvement strategies for the World of Dead Letters 
As we have demonstrated above, women, homosexuals and religious minorities are, 
inter alia, still subject to discrimination in the workplace in the four CEE countries. At 
the same time, violations of the legislation on working time are still rather common in 
the four countries we studied. Closer scrutiny reveals that most of these shortcomings 
are due to enforcement deficiencies, not to transposition failures. In most of the cases 
13 we researched, there hence are “good letters” that, however, need more support in order 
to turn them into “living rights”. Crucial hurdles for making a practical success of EU 
social rights are typically a lack of resources generally, particularly for labour courts 
and equal treatment bodies; education and information shortcomings; and weakness of 
civil society representation. 
In order to go beyond empirical compliance studies and instead try to give positive 
stimuli for reforms, we systematically collected ideas on how to improve the current 
status quo in the four countries. To this end, we organised a set of intensive focus group 
sessions involving representatives from a wide range of civil society representatives in 
each of the four countries. In order to foster conditions conducive to an atmosphere of 
trust and open discussion of potentially sensitive information, members were selected 
according to similarity of interests. In each country studied, three different focus groups 
engaged in a discussion, divided according mainly to the divide of interests between 
employers and employees but also other potential conflict lines, where useful. Each 
focus group brought together between four and twelve local participants plus members 
of our research team for three to four hours. Moreover, we convened a transnational 
strategy workshop in Vienna, which brought together experts and practitioners from all 
four countries plus Austria for a full day to discuss the status quo and possible 
improvements. 
The resulting recommendations for improving the status quo on the domestic level are 
based on the analysis of numerous shortcomings, as summarised above. They fall into 
two groups: firstly, strategies that directly target the processes or institutions 
supervising rule enforcement (a below); and secondly, improvement strategies that seek 
to enhance social rights by strengthening actors that may support those fighting for their 
rights (b below). Such measures could hence indirectly work towards better 
implementation of EU social rights, at least in the longer term.  
a) Direct ways to foster good practice in the Member States 
Legislative or at least administrative action will typically be indispensable for 
strengthening the relevant institutions or their working modes. Member State 
governments and parliaments should therefore be convinced to improve the respective 
conditions by, for example (see below in detail), increasing resources, simplifying 
labour laws, establishing specialised departments for equal opportunity policy, 
strengthening Equal Treatment Bodies and Labour Inspectorates, and finally improving 
the court systems. 
14 Adequate resources are a crucial issue: The problem of scarce means applies to all 
enforcement and litigation bodies more or less alike, particularly labour inspectorates, 
courts and equal treatment bodies. In most cases they require a significant increase of 
funding to provide more personnel and advanced training for staff to ensure higher 
effectiveness and turn around, a better quality of decisions and general awareness of 
anti-discrimination but also working time issues, thus also enabling the development of 
good practice.  
Simplification of Labour Laws could also be a promising means to proffer social rights 
in practice: Labour law provisions tend to be phrased in a highly complex fashion, 
making it difficult to impossible for individuals to derive their rights directly from the 
text of the law. This adds to the burden of having to explain the rights and obligations of 
all involved, which is already comparably high given the manifold recent changes made 
in this area of law in the CEECs. 
At the level of the administration, specialised Ministerial Departments for Equal 
Opportunity Policy would be useful: Governments may want to consider 
institutionalising a sufficiently equipped department with experts on such issues, also to 
ensure the mainstreaming of equal treatment in all policy areas. Our study revealed that 
to date, there are frequent changes to specialised departments within the governments of 
the CEECs, which is detrimental to a coherent equal opportunity policy. Often there are 
‘Units’ within several ministries that are responsible for the enforcement of a gender 
equality policy within the respective ministry. However, these units are underdeveloped 
and since they are subordinated administrative units they typically cannot produce any 
effective impact. 
Equal Treatment Bodies are central institutions in our field, too: Most countries have 
established equal treatment bodies, however, some have only granted the very minimum 
powers and resources to such institutions, thus making effective work and advancement 
of equality issues very difficult. There appear to be a number of possibilities to enhance 
compliance with anti-discrimination standards and principles:  
•  Equal Treatment Bodies should have a legally enshrined right to bring individual 
complaints to court.  
•  Best practice shows that ex officio powers and the possibility of imposing 
administrative sanctions are a very effective way to improve equality practices 
and policies.  
•  Given that Equal Treatment Bodies are generally designed – and also perceived 
– as watchdogs and advocates for individuals, it appears necessary to entrust the 
overarching issues of awareness raising and information sharing in a different 
15 way. One way forward could be the creation of a separate communication 
department within the entity, which receives additional financial resources for 
these important tasks.  
•  Equal Treatment Bodies need visibility. If the people concerned do not know 
about the existence of these institutions, it is not possible for them to seek 
assistance. A separate web site, on which all the relevant information is 
available and European and national case law is published, would be an 
important step supporting the development in the right direction.   
•  Sharing best practice has proven time and again to be beneficial to all parties, 
thus the experts concur that an increase of trans-national cooperation among the 
bodies, also cooperation with NGOs, will strengthen the effectiveness of equal 
treatment practices.  
•  To increase accessibility of Equal Treatment Bodies it is necessary to 
decentralise them. Bringing them to the local level ensures that individual action 
is not obstructed because the body is perceived as being too far away. 
Additionally, administrative and financial independence seems important. 
 
Strengthening the Labour Inspectorates will be an indispensable means of improved 
enforcement of EU social law in the CEECs: Labour Inspectorates are well established 
monitoring agencies, however, they struggle in all Member States to fulfil the manifold 
tasks put to them. Traditionally these bodies focus on issues of illegal work as well as 
safety and health at work. The expertise on discrimination issues but also the sensitivity 
toward issues of working time therefore needs to be strengthened in most countries. In 
addition it appears that one way of improving their authority could be increasing the 
severity of sanctions and an increase of leverage for the individual inspectors on the 
most suitable sanction(s). Often the superior ministry gives guidelines for the Labour 
Inspectorates indicating that sanctions and especially fines should be the ‘last resort’, to 
be used only if and where consensual modes fail. In practice this appears to favour 
employers. Additionally, in order to enhance the adherence to anti-discrimination 
provisions it appears necessary to empower the Labour Inspectorates to take ex officio 
action in such cases. Legislation should be amended accordingly. Also, it may be useful 
for Labour Inspectorates to increase the cooperation at the bi-national, multi-national 
and European levels to share best practice and to increase their efficiency. The most 
important task in the field of labour inspections, however, remains the expansion of 
their resources. As long as too few labour inspectors have to deal with too many tasks, 
effective and efficient supervision of the compliance of the employers with labour law 
provisions will remain difficult to achieve. 
16 Finally, court system improvements are an essential remedy if citizens shall be 
empowered to make living rights out of their social rights granted in EU Directives: 
Under this heading, a number of relevant steps were discussed in the frame of our 
expert meetings:  
•  Specialized Labour Courts:  In some Member States labour disputes are 
handled by civil courts, which may have specialized departments for 
industrial legal action. From the experience of countries with specialized 
labour courts it is safe to assume that separate labour courts benefit the 
quality of jurisprudence in this field. This also allows for judges to develop 
stronger expertise in labour law issues. Therefore, employers and employees 
can take advantage of decisions that are better tailored to their needs. 
Furthermore, lay judges with relevant expertise taking part in procedures 
handled by specialized labour courts may add further to the degree of 
satisfaction with the outcome of labour disputes.  
•  Mediation: Court cases are often the result of bad communication, thus court 
action is not always the most suitable means of resolving such disputes. Less 
adversarial means of dispute resolution can be more effective and efficient in 
finding the best possible way forward. Mediation is a low cost, least formal 
way of addressing disputes for sensitive issues such as equality and working 
time issues. Contrary to other civil proceedings, the aim of any labour 
dispute is to return to a feasible working relationship and ensure that the 
employee – with her/his expertise – continues to work in that very work 
place. However, issues of balancing the power between the employer and 
employee (trade union) may require special facilitation. Also, the closed-
door fashion of such proceedings makes it difficult to share the outcome of 
mediation with the wider public and thereby raise awareness about labour 
disputes and add to the overall legal culture of society.  
•  Actio popularis: In societies where the settlement of disputes over cases of 
alleged discrimination is not yet common, it may be beneficial to give 
individuals the opportunity to join in a collective action to ensure that the 
violation of their rights is addressed. This possibility could in particular be 
strengthened by giving representative organizations such as NGOs and trade 
unions the right to initiate such cases, opening the possibility for individuals 
to join in. Experiences from other countries – also in other fields like 
environmental policy – show that the actio popularis has the potential to be 
an effective method to enforce collective interests.
5 Also, because it solves 
the ‘David versus Goliath’ problem of one employee trying to fight against 
an employer who is perceived as far more powerful.  
•  Right of Trade Unions to Represent Individuals in Court Cases: Given the 
current constraints in the field of labour disputes individuals appear hesitant 
                                                 
5   On how public interests in environmental policy can be enforced through court litigation see de 
Sadeleer/Roller/Dross (2005); Deimann/Dyssli (1995); Ebbesson (2002); Schmidt/Zschiesche/ 
Rosenbaum (2004). 
17 to take action against alleged violations of their labour rights. Therefore, it 
may be feasible to take advantage of established representative 
organizations, such as trade unions, to take action on behalf of such persons. 
Thereby, expert bodies could also take on a part of the watchdog function in 
this field. This also serves as a way of empowering such organizations. 
Legislation should be amended accordingly, to explicitly grant the right of 
individual representation to specialized organisations. 
•  Protection of Victims and Witnesses: One of the minimum requirements to 
ensure that victims seek redress for violations while their concerns for 
privacy are safeguarded and their current employment is secured is the 
protection of victims and possible witnesses throughout the process.  
•  Support for Court Proceedings: Many victims do not seek redress for ill 
conduct because they fear the costs of such proceedings. A number of 
Member States provide support for persons who could otherwise not afford 
legal action. This can be done in a variety of ways: financial support or the 
institutionalisation of an agreement with the Bar Association, which 
provides a roster of attorneys who work pro bono. 
•  Extending Training Possibilities: Lawyers in all transition countries have 
had to adjust to a rapidly changing legal landscape: many laws have been 
amended multiple times within a relatively short period. Most of them have 
not had sufficient time to update their knowledge in specialized fields as 
well as in general EU law. Furthermore, working time as well as anti-
discrimination affairs are very complex matters. Working time laws contain 
a great many of derogations and exemptions, which can hardly be reviewed 
even by experts with long standing experience. Anti-discrimination affairs 
are permanently enhanced by the jurisdiction of the ECJ, which means that 
practitioners have to be familiar with several recent judgements of the Court. 
Thus, substantial additional training should be provided for attorneys, judges 
and specialists such as labour inspectors. Additionally, it could be helpful to 
include independent experts in new highly specialized fields such as anti-
discrimination to ensure that training and application are state of the art. 
•  Developing Case Law: In order to ensure effective awareness raising it 
would be beneficial to enhance the transparency of decisions. This can be 
done in a number of ways, e.g. institutionalising the anonymous publication 
of decisions, possibly also through a website. Such efforts assist the process 
of finding mutually agreed solutions to cases of discrimination and working 
time. Practitioners could easier catch up on the recent legal developments, 
which is of crucial importance for a better application of the laws. Only 
practitioners who know the current legal position and judgements of the 
competent bodies can guarantee a complete application. Therefore it would 
also be necessary to translate the ECJ’s important judgements of the past 
into the respective languages.    
A positive side effect of better-published court decisions is the increased 
public awareness, which adds to the knowledge about such issues and thus 
leads to better practices; it also encourages victims to seek redress for 
perceived violations of their rights. 
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b) Indirect improvement strategies 
Further efforts to remedy the less than satisfying situation in the field of application and 
enforcement of EU social policy in the new member states could and should aim at 
strengthening civil society actors and at increasing media attention to social right 
implementation.  
Strengthening cooperative governance seems one promising project: The new EU 
Member States established some consultation and coordination patterns between public 
and private actors as part of their pre-accession adaptation to EU-level standard 
procedures. However, the culture of such ‘Tripartism’ could be further strengthened in 
our four countries. While consultation among social partners takes place on a regular 
basis, the frequency and scope of these meetings could be increased in most countries. 
Higher frequency of meetings could assist efforts to rectify the impression that some 
bodies are merely formally established and are not yet working on a mutual and 
collaborative level.  
A further point stressed by a number of practitioners from interest groups involved in 
our project is the need for better inclusion in drafting processes, particularly with regard 
to time provided for comments and statements on EU and national draft legislation. 
Given that the Member States by now already have transposed the pre-accession acquis 
and thus should now have more time in preparing legislation, a rapid improvement of 
the status quo can be expected. 
It should also be noted that Tripartism could be slowed down because of ineffective 
cooperation between and among employers’ and employees’ representatives 
(‘bipartism’, intra-group relations). Therefore, the CEEC's newly established employer 
organisations as well as trade unions, which had to adjust their agenda in the wake of 
transition, should find institutionalised ways of increasing their level of coordination 
and cooperation. 
With regard to specific interests, the important role of trade unions in putting 
employees’ rights and entitlements into effect could potentially be strengthened further. 
One possibility is that trade unions should have the right to bring a case to court on 
behalf of an individual or a group of employees. To increase the rights of trade unions 
is, however, just one side of the coin. Equally important is to ensure sufficient financial 
19 resources.
6 Close collaboration among NGOs, trade unions and other civil society 
actors could be useful for common fund raising and lobbying. Especially in the field of 
equal treatment and anti-discrimination the cooperation between trade unions and 
NGOs can be strengthened. Therefore, some of the classical role models – still 
represented in some conservative parts of the trade unions – should be adapted. The 
“male breadwinner model” – in the past sometimes an implicit aim of trade unions – 
cannot be combined with modern equal treatment policy. Since, in most CEECs, 
supportive civil society actors are weak and/or small, closer cooperation could (last but 
not least) raise their visibility. Corresponding networks should be established at the 
national, trans-national and European level, or strengthened were they exist already. 
In short, civil society actors, such as women’s groups and trade unions, can contribute a 
lot to a better implementation of EU social law by raising awareness among individual 
citizens and by acting as watch-dogs vis-à-vis their governments. However, cooperative 
governance potentials have certainly not yet been fully exploited in the CEECs. 
Improving communicative action on social rights is another promising improvement 
strategy: Labour law is highly complex, but only if the people concerned know their 
rights and entitlements, can they be motivated to go to court where they can enforce 
their claims through legal action. Broad dissemination of brochures on crucial laws, 
customised for a non-expert readership, could prove highly useful. 
Otherwise, adequate coverage by the mass media is certainly crucial, particularly when 
it comes to efforts aimed at altering role models and overcoming stereotypes. Also, 
media are important for giving victims (e.g. of discrimination) a voice. On the other 
hand, the risk of going public is that media change the story (or misinterpret it). 
Journalism education should thus include sensitivity training on equal treatment issues. 
Furthermore, it is important to strike a balance between the publicity of cases and the 
protection of the victims’ privacy. 
                                                 
6   Currently, those unions which are only funded through membership fees particularly have to cope 
not only with a constantly diminishing membership but also with the ensuing economic 
constraints. For trade unions (but other interest groups as well), a ‘tax deduction system’ may be 
able to improve the financial situation and make them more independent. In Slovakia, for 
example, every employee can donate two percent of his/her income tax to one of the NGOs that 
are on an official list. However, such a system has shortcomings: Firms may create their own 
‘NGOs’ and demand more or less openly that their employees donate to this entity. Given that 
donators make their own choices, NGOs with less “attractive” topics such as racism or domestic 
violence usually fare poorly in this system. Naturally, the degree of publicity also has an impact 
on the level of donations. 
20 Media coverage on equal treatment policies should be enhanced not only in quality, but 
also in frequency. Relevant authorities and bodies should try to provide journalists with 
‘tailored’ information, since the latter often do not have the time to investigate on their 
own, in depth. Interest groups (e.g. trade unions and employer federations) with own 
newspapers could reserve a specialised section to EU-related information and the 
follow-up on national level. 
A further means to disseminate information on EU-related social rights could be Equal 
Treatment reports and articles on court proceedings, but only after being customised for 
public use. For example, reports by Equal Treatment Bodies could highlight best 
practices instead of only mentioning lengthy lists of “problems”. Efforts to alter the 
overall situation, particularly by overcoming stereotypes, can be supported by showing 
positive examples in conjunction with remaining problems. 
Finally, scientific studies will sometimes be needed to shed light on complex questions 
(such as regarding reasons of the lack of efficiency of a court system, or of attitudes 
leading to discrimination). In Hungary, for example, a research project was successful 
in revealing stereotypes against Roma people within the police.
7 The publication of 
such results can be expected to influence the decision-making in courts and ministries. 
Customised versions for broad dissemination throughout civil society will further 
enhance the effectiveness of this strategy. 
Not in the least, teaching on equal treatment policies is an important issue, in the 
CEECs and elsewhere. Stereotypes within society, such as school books depicting the 
husband reading the newspaper while the wife cooks, are not easily changed – above all 
if they are reproduced in mass media and advertisements. What is called for are 
education/training efforts on various levels. Besides addressing adults (e.g. via 
information at the company level) it is equally important to attract the attention of 
children/adolescents to this topic. Therefore, equal treatment should become established 
in school and university curricula and, more generally, mainstreamed in official 
publications. Teachers together with experts (from Equal Treatment Bodies or 
Ombudsperson’s offices) could elaborate an approach on how to teach human rights 
best. 
Lastly among the possibilities to (at least indirectly and in the long run) improve the 
situation of social rights in EU member states, it should be mentioned that language 
empowerment, in general, could help to improve effective implementation of EU law in 
                                                 
7   Expert information shared during our Strategy Workshop. 
21 practice. It is difficult to represent interests, follow EU decision-making processes and 
participate in debates at the EU level with lacking language proficiency in English, and 
the latter is not yet sufficiently common in the CEECs (such as in some other EU 
Member States, for sure). 
 
IV. Conclusions and outlook 
This paper has presented results from empirical research on the implementation of EU 
social rights in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia. While 
transposition performance is relatively good, all four countries display significant 
problems in the field of application and enforcement.  
We have argued in previous research on the EU15 that there are different country 
clusters with different typical procedural patterns and, therefore, different styles of 
implementing EU legislation (Falkner/Treib/Hartlapp/Leiber 2005). These different 
“worlds of compliance” can be used as a filter that decides which explanatory factors 
are relevant for different countries and what the direction of their influence is 
(Falkner/Hartlapp/Treib 2007). To capture the combination of a) politicised 
transposition and b) systematic shortcomings in enforcement and application, we 
suggested a fourth category covering (inter alia, not  exclusively) the four countries 
studied here: the “world of dead letters” (see Table 1 above, and for more detail see 
Falkner/Treib 2007). 
The main part of this paper presented a set of strategies to improve the current state of 
affairs. It goes without saying that improving the implementation of EU law in the new 
CEEC member states involves intricate issues at various levels including the economy, 
the administrations, the legal systems, the interest group set-ups and the interest 
intermediation systems. 
Therefore, any effective reform will most probably need many parents, and the CEECs 
will without any doubt need both encouragement and support by the “old” EU. Neither 
benign neglect nor a snobbish attitude are in place: Firstly, the situation is truly 
alarming. Secondly, and as outlined above, the CEECs' poor performance in application 
and enforcement is not a deliberate strategy but caused by genuine capacity problems 
and structural issues.  
Clearly, also the EU institutions have a role to play in “making the letters live” in new 
member states. In principle, implementation is a rather de-centralised affair in European 
22 integration, but the Community treaties require the European Commission to ensure that 
they are properly implemented (e.g. Article 211 ECT), together with any EU decision 
taken on the basis of the treaties (the “secondary law”). The Commission fulfils its role 
as guardian of the treaties mainly through the “failure to act” procedure under Article 
226 ECT. If it considers that a Member State has failed to fulfil an obligation under the 
treaty, it can initiate proceedings, potentially leading up to a ruling by the European 
Court of Justice and, if this is not complied with, finally even to financial sanctions to 
be imposed by the ECJ. 
Although the Commission’s enforcement policy has recently been somewhat intensified 
(as a response to increasing public awareness of compliance failures), it could be 
helpful if the European Commission would further systematise and increase its efforts. 
Regular monitoring reports have already proven to be both a useful and very successful 
way to ensure better quality implementation during the accession process of new 
Member States. More systematic and regular Commission scrutiny, leading (for 
example) to annual publication of individual national reports on the implementation of 
the acquis – including new legislation – in all the Member States would most probably 
lead to a better respect of EU rules at the national level. The overall monitoring function 
of the Commission would probably be enhanced if the interaction with NGOs and trade 
unions was intensified. These sub-state actors often have valuable information 
concerning a Member State’s shortcomings in transposition, application and 
enforcement. Overall, the timing of the Commission’s response to breaches – 
particularly to overt ones – should be speeded up whenever possible and more resources 
should be devoted to the enforcement of EU derived regulations. 
It is true that the governments do not always support this, for they have an immediate 
self-interest in preserving autonomy, including in the field of policy implementation. 
However, they need to realize that this is rather short sighted. Considering the extreme 
interdependence prevailing in the EU, systematically producing dead letters would in 
the end be detrimental to the goals set by the Community, which are thought serve the 
interests of all member states. 
In that sense, it is high time that all relevant political actors join their forces to prevent 
the emergence of a potential vicious circle whereby the modes of deficient compliance 
with EU law described in this paper might actually spread across the entire European 
Union and endanger its very future. 
 
23 V. References 
Ágh, Attila, 2003: Anticipatory and Adaptive Europeanization in Hungary. Budapest: 
Hungarian Centre for Democracy Studies. 
Börzel, Tanja A., 2003: Environmental Leaders and Laggards in Europe: Why there is 
(not) a 'Southern Problem'. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
CEC, 2006: Industrial Relations in Europe. Luxembourg: Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities. 
Council of the European Union, 2006, Press Release, Extraordinary Council Meeting - 
Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs, Brussels 7 November 
2006 [Accessed on: 9.3.2007], 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/lsa/91539.pdf. 
de Sadeleer, Nicolas/Gerhard  Roller/Miriam Dross, 2005: Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters and the Role of NGOs. Groningen: European Law 
Publishing. 
Deimann, Sven/Bernard Dyssli, 1995: Environmental Rights: Law, Litigation & Access 
to Justice. London: Cameron May. 
Douglas, Mary, 2001: Culture as Explanation: Cultural Concerns. In: Neil J. 
Smelser/Paul B. Baltes (eds.), International Encyclopedia of the Social & 
Behavioral Sciences. Vol. 5. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 3147-3151. 
Duina, Francesco G., 1999: Harmonizing Europe: Nation-States within the Common 
Market. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Ebbesson, Jonas, 2002: Access to Justice in Environmental Matters in the EU. The 
Hague/London/Boston: Kluwer Law International. 
EIRO, 2006, Deadlock in progress on revision of working time directive. Last update: 
12.2.2007 [Accessed on: 9.3 2007],    
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2006/12/articles/eu0612019i.html. 
Falkner, Gerda/Miriam Hartlapp/Oliver Treib, 2007: Worlds of Compliance: Why 
Leading Approaches to European Union Implementation Are Only ‘Sometimes-true 
Theories’. In: European Journal of Political Research 46(3), 395-416. 
Falkner, Gerda/Oliver Treib, 2007: Three Worlds of Compliance or Four? The EU15 
Compared to New Member States. In: Journal of Common Market Studies 
forthcoming (published as a working paper in the IHS political science series: 
http://www.ihs.ac.at). 
Falkner, Gerda/Oliver Treib/Miriam Hartlapp/Simone Leiber, 2005: Complying with 
Europe: EU Harmonisation and Soft Law in the Member States. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Goetz, Klaus H., 2005: The New Member States and the EU: Responding to Europe. In: 
Simon Bulmer/Christian Lequesne (eds.), The Member States of the European 
Union. New York: Oxford University Press, 254-280. 
24 Jordan, Andrew, 1999: The Implementation of EU Environmental Policy: A Policy 
Problem without a Political Solution? In: Environment and Planning C 17(1), 69-
90. 
Knill, Christoph/Andrea Lenschow (eds.), 2000: Implementing EU Environmental 
Policy: New Directions and Old Problems. Manchester: Manchester University 
Press. 
Puchala, Donald J., 1972: Of Blind Men, Elephants and International Integration. In: 
Journal of Common Market Studies 10(3), 267-284. 
Richardson, Jeremy J., 1996: Eroding EU Policies: Implementation Gaps, Cheating and 
Re-Steering. In: Jeremy J. Richardson (ed.) European Union: Power and Policy-
Making. London: Routledge, 278-294. 
Schimmelfennig, Frank/Stefan Engert/Knobel Heiko, 2005: The Impact of EU Political 
Conditionality. In: Frank Schimmelfennig/Ulrich Sedelmeier (eds.), The 
Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
29-50. 
Schimmelfennig, Frank/Ulrich Sedelmeier, 2004: Governance by Conditionality: EU 
Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In: 
Journal of European Public Policy 11(4), 661-679. 
Schmidt, Alexander/Michael Zschiesche/Marion Rosenbaum, 2004: Die 
naturschutzrechtliche Verbandsklage in Deutschland: Praxis und Perspektiven. 
Berlin: Springer. 
Siedentopf, Heinrich/Jacques Ziller (eds.), 1988: Making European Policies Work: The 
Implementation of Community Legislation in the Member States. 2 Volumes. 
London: Sage. 
Swidler, Ann, 2001: Cultural Expression and Action. In: Neil J. Smelser/Paul B. Baltes 
(eds.),  International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences. Vol. 5. 
Amsterdam: Elsevier, 3063-3069. 
 
25 